




An exercise in detachment:  




Both key regional organisations in Europe  – the European Union (EU) 
and the Council of Europe (CoE) – have played an increasingly signifi-
cant role in moulding current asylum law in Europe.1 The EU now has 
a fully fledged, reasonably sophisticated asylum policy, constituted by 
a range of legal instruments and jurisprudence covering all key aspects 
of asylum claims (Peers 2016). This body of law and policy has a direct 
and explicit impact on sexual minority asylum claims (SMACs) (Ferreira 
2018).2 Although the activity of the CoE in the field of asylum is consid-
erably scattered and patchy compared to the EU’s, the CoE has never-
theless gradually produced an important body of law and policy that 
affects SMACs. This is mostly because of the work of the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court).
I will consider how the CoE has contributed to shaping the current 
European legal and policy framework relating to SMACs. While there is 
already academic work that comprehensively analyses this theme in the 
context of the EU and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (Ferreira 
2018), that is not the case in relation to the CoE. My focus in this chapter 
will be, in particular, on how the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
has dealt with SMACs. Similarly to the general situation in relation to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on sexual orientation (Johnson 2013), the CoE 
policy and the Strasbourg jurisprudence have a significant influence on 
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gap in the academic literature and develop a thorough understanding 
of the framework developed in the context of the CoE on this matter. 
Enforcement issues will fall outside the scope of this chapter.
Through this work, I  wish to contribute to a growing body of lit-
erature that adopts a queer perspective on the activity of the Strasbourg 
Court. Inspired by an extensive body of queer literature that explores the 
sociocultural nature, diversity and fluidity of gender and sexuality (for 
example Butler 1990; Sedgwick 2008) and uses ‘queer’ as a tool of cri-
tique in the field of migration (Fernandez 2017), I add my voice to those 
that offer a queer deconstructive reading of human rights discourse to 
challenge the lack of universality of sexuality rights and foster emancipa-
tion (see, for example, Gonzalez- Salzberg 2019; Langlois 2018). While 
acknowledging that merely granting rights will not achieve sufficiently 
radical change for sexual minorities from a queer perspective, one cannot 
but also demand the recognition of rights as at least part of the solution 
(Langlois 2018). In addition to a queer perspective, it is important to 
consider an intersectional perspective. Building on the work of inter-
sectional scholars such as Crenshaw (1989) and Yuval- Davis (2006), 
which requires us to ponder the range of individuals’ characteristics and 
their interactions in order to understand people’s social and political 
experiences, I will consider how the Strasbourg Court can offer a holistic 
analysis of SMAC applications in order to vindicate applicants’ rights and 
challenge injustice.
The key argument put forward in this chapter is that, despite some 
isolated positive developments, the CoE in general and the Strasbourg 
Court in particular are failing SMAC applicants. The jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court shows an astonishing degree of deference to member 
states’ policies and decision- making in this field, thus effectively not 
upholding the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
betraying the applicants’ rights. This deference creates a worrying detach-
ment from the suffering and risks to which SMAC applicants are exposed 
when the Court denies their claims, something that has been argued 
in relation to the Strasbourg jurisprudence on migration in general as 
well (Dembour 2015). This argument will be substantiated throughout 
this chapter through an analysis of the relevant policy documents and 
numerous examples drawn from the jurisprudence in question. The 
significance of this analysis thus lies mainly in the identification of the 
shortcomings of the CoE’s policy and the Strasbourg Court’s jurispru-
dence in this field, which will allow commentators, policy- makers and 
decision- makers to gain a systematic and critical understanding of this 
field and plan their response accordingly.
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I will proceed by delineating in the next section the role of the CoE, 
and the Strasbourg Court in particular, in developing both asylum and 
sexual orientation law at a European level, albeit by adopting lines of 
direction that are essentially divergent. The third section, ‘The sexual 
minority asylum jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court’, explores the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence on SMACs, by offering an overview and a sum-
mary assessment of the relevant decisions. Next, ‘Exposing the skeletons 
in the Court’s closet’ explores three key themes that emerge in that juris-
prudence, namely the threshold for violation of ECHR articles, the rules 
of evidence and credibility assessment, and how the Court deals with 
intersecting characteristics and sociocultural factors. The final section 
summarises why the CoE, and the Strasbourg Court in particular, should 
deal more forcefully with these claims.
Asylum and sexual orientation in the Council of 
Europe: resisting the meeting of the roads?
All CoE member states are bound by the 1951 Refugee Convention,3 but 
not all are bound by the 1967 Protocol,4 which extends the geographical 
scope of the 1951 Convention beyond Europe and removes its temporal 
restriction to pre- 1951 events. Moreover, the CoE itself is not bound by 
the Refugee Convention or its Protocol and does not have a fully fledged 
policy on asylum matters. Nonetheless, the CoE has acquired a progres-
sively significant role in the field of asylum. Despite the absence of an 
asylum policy as such, several of its bodies have taken a noteworthy role 
in this field. For example, in 2005 the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly 
warned domestic asylum authorities about the need to implement 
an efficient asylum system without jeopardising the standards in the 
Refugee Convention and its Protocol and the ECHR and its protocols.5 
Furthermore, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) produces 
guidelines on the treatment of migrants and asylum claimants, which 
are a valuable tool to advocate for better conditions at a domestic level 
(Danisi 2009). The Committee has also urged CoE member states to use 
detention only as a measure of last resort and to provide detainees with 
adequate conditions (European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2017), which is 
directly consequential for asylum claimants.
The Strasbourg Court, above all, along with the now extinct 
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of jurisprudence that applies the ECHR to asylum claimants, despite the 
ECHR not possessing any norm explicitly related to asylum. In short, 
although the Strasbourg Court does not take decisions that consider 
the final outcome of asylum claims as such, it does decide on the vio-
lation of ECHR articles that may protect asylum claimants. In doing so, 
the Court engages in a ‘balancing exercise between the effective protec-
tion of human rights, and the Contracting States’ autonomy to regulate 
migration and refugee flows’ (Buchinger & Steinkellner 2010, 421). The 
Strasbourg Court offers asylum claimants protection mostly on the basis 
of Articles 3 ECHR (prohibition of torture)7 and, to a lesser extent, 2 
ECHR (right to life).8 In the Court’s own words:
its case- law has found responsibility attaching to Contracting States 
in respect of expelling persons who are at risk of treatment con-
trary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. This is based on the 
fundamental importance of these provisions, whose guarantees it 
is imperative to render effective in practice … Such compelling con-
siderations do not automatically apply under the other provisions 
of the Convention. On a purely pragmatic basis, it cannot be 
required that an expelling Contracting State only return an alien to 
a country which is in full and effective enforcement of all the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Convention.9
The Court may, nevertheless, also consider violations of Articles 4 (pro-
hibition of slavery and forced labour),10 5 (right to liberty and security),11 
8 (right to respect for private and family life)12 and 13 (right to an 
effective remedy)13 of the ECHR, if the asylum claimant has suffered or 
risks suffering a flagrant denial of these rights in the CoE host country. 
The Court will not, however, entertain claims based on Article 6 (right 
to a fair trial), because it only applies to civil and criminal matters, 
asylum (and migration) being neither. Most important, the Court 
not only limits itself for the most part to considering Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR violations, which restricts immensely the scope of rights asylum 
claimants may claim (Dembour 2015), but it also adopts an excessively 
high threshold for finding a violation of these articles by requiring that 
they be ‘systematically’ violated (see the subsection ‘A bird’s- eye view’ 
below). This is the cornerstone of the detachment Strasbourg adopts in 
relation to asylum claimants. Moreover, jurisprudence is also in tension 
with the intersectional approach adopted in this analysis, because 
asylum applicants whose particular combination of characteristics may 
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their experiences fully acknowledged or their rights vindicated in such 
broad- brush, excessive requirement of ‘systematic’ violation of Articles 
2 or 3 ECHR. The greatest indictment in this respect comes from the 
fact that applicants have come to find United Nations (UN) bodies, 
particularly the Commission Against Torture, more effective in staying 
removals of asylum claimants than the Strasbourg Court (CDDH & DH- 
SYSC 2019, 100), despite the widely known shortcomings of the UN 
human rights system. Undoubtedly, the CoE needs to further refine 
its legal and policy framework on asylum and render it more respon-
sive to the needs, interests and rights of the individuals affected. This 
will be illustrated by the analysis of SMAC jurisprudence in subsequent 
sections.
In parallel, the CoE has also developed a rich body of jurispru-
dence on sexual orientation but this has so far not influenced the SMAC 
jurisprudence of the Court. Despite some legitimate criticism (see, for 
example, Ammaturo 2017), the CoE has been active in facilitating what 
has been termed the ‘law of small change’ in relation to sexual orienta-
tion matters: slowly but steadily, there has been progress, from decrim-
inalisation of homosexual activity to same- sex marriage and same- sex 
adoption (Waaldijk 2003). Indeed, the CoE has contributed consider-
ably to such progress, including by making some positive changes at a 
domestic level. Yet the legal framework of the CoE has been slow in tack-
ling the violation of sexual orientation- related rights, which have been 
increasingly recognised at the domestic and international levels (Human 
Rights Council 2016; ‘Yogyakarta Principles’14 2007), thus revealing an 
insufficiently queer reading of the ECHR.
Although the ECHR does not contain a stand- alone non- 
discrimination clause,15 the Strasbourg Court has developed a non- 
discrimination jurisprudence that also protects sexual minorities. This 
has included the use of Article 8 ECHR on the right to family and private 
life, often in combination with Article 14 ECHR, to prohibit the criminal-
isation of homosexuality,16 preclude bans on homosexuals in the armed 
forces,17 eliminate discrimination in relation to the age of sexual consent 
on grounds of sexual orientation,18 condemn discrimination against same- 
sex couples in relation to tenancy rights,19 protect the parental rights of 
homosexual fathers,20 recognise that same- sex relationships are a form 
of ‘family life’21 and safeguard the family reunification rights of same- sex 
couples.22
The work of the Strasbourg Court has thus been increasingly sup-
portive of sexual minorities’ legal claims and this has been welcomed 
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‘LGBTI [lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex] activists have been 
empowered vis- à- vis their governments by their access to the European 
courts when access to the national political arena was blocked, and … 
the ECJ [CJEU] and, to a lesser extent, the ECtHR [Strasbourg Court] 
have been empowered by LGBTI activism’ (van der Vleuten 2014, 119). 
It may be the case that the Strasbourg Court has not been sufficiently 
progressive in relation to all sexual minority matters and the case of 
SMACs may in fact be one such matter, as the jurisprudence analysis 
below will show. Nonetheless, the Strasbourg Court has been found to 
be more proactive than the CJEU in relation to sexual minorities, to the 
extent that the CJEU tends only to offer protection to sexual minority 
claims when the Strasbourg Court has already initiated that legal direc-
tion (Wintemute 2015).23 In this regard, Ammaturo importantly points 
out that human rights frameworks inform a sense of European excep-
tionalism in relation to sex, sexuality and gender, which contributes 
to a ‘European sexual and gendered citizenship’ that has at its core the 
recognition of LGBTIQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex, queer 
and other) rights in the European political community (Ammaturo 
2017, 100). Consequently, Europe is no longer just a ‘geo- political area 
and becomes a prescriptive and normative idea, almost an aspiration’ 
(Ammaturo 2017, 100). And yet, homonationalist agendas attempt to 
instrumentalise advancements on LGBTIQ+ rights for xenophobic and 
racist purposes (Bracke 2012; Mole 2017), and the Court’s jurispru-
dence on sexual minorities has contributed to the construction of an 
‘essentialised, privatised, victimised and respectable “homosexual”, simul-
taneously de- politicising, normativising and domesticating the “homo-
sexual subject” ’ (Ammaturo 2018, 576; emphasis in original).
There undoubtedly remains much work to be done in the context of 
the CoE to ensure that asylum claimants are able to vindicate their right 
to international protection, and much could still be done to improve how 
sexual minorities are treated and recognised as fully fledged members of 
society. From a queer theoretical perspective, the Court’s jurisprudence 
is clearly still a long way from adequately acknowledging and respecting 
human sexual and gender variety and fluidity. Moreover, asylum 
claimants are re- victimised by Strasbourg’s detachment from their needs, 
interests and rights. The snapshot above suggests that Strasbourg has 
become an increasingly ‘pro- LGBT’ court, but ‘anti- migrant’ as well. This 
might explain the hesitant and often inconsistent way the CoE, in gen-
eral, and the Strasbourg Court, in particular, have dealt with SMACs so 
far, as will now be explored.
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The sexual minority asylum jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court
It has been clear for several years in the context of CoE asylum law 
and policy that SMACs deserve legal protection. For example, the CoE 
Committee of Ministers has called on member states to fulfil their inter-
national obligations in relation to SMACs:
Asylum seekers should be protected from any discriminatory pol-
icies or practices on grounds of sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity; in particular, appropriate measures should be taken to prevent 
risks of physical violence, including sexual abuse, verbal aggression 
or other forms of harassment against asylum seekers deprived of 
their liberty, and to ensure their access to information relevant to 
their particular situation.24
The European Commission of Human Rights (which until 1998 acted as 
scrutiniser of claims before they were allowed to reach the Court) and 
the Strasbourg Court have had a growing number of opportunities over 
the years to establish a position in relation to SMACs.25 This jurispru-
dence is quantitatively summarised in Figure 5.1.26
Amongst the 23 decisions that have been identified, the great 






































Inadmissible or struck out No violation Violation
Figure 5.1 Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court on sexual minority 
asylum claims, 1990– 2019. The figure sets out the number of sexual 
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applications found to be manifestly ill- founded) or striking out,27 two 
(9 per cent) have been of no violation of an ECHR article and only one 
(4 per cent) has been of violation of an ECHR article. These figures alone 
suggest a reluctance on the part of the Court to support sexual minority 
applicants claiming asylum. The figures also suggest a growing number 
of relevant decisions over time, with figures increasing since 2015, which 
tallies with the growing body of scholarly, NGO and media discussion on 
this theme.28 A qualitative analysis of these decisions, however, tells us 
much more: it presents a severely inadequate picture from a queer inter-
sectional perspective.
a bird’s- eye view
The first time the Strasbourg Court decided on a case involving a SMAC 
was in 1990, in B. v United Kingdom, when a gay Cypriot man claimed his 
deportation to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would 
constitute a violation of Articles 8, 13 and 14 ECHR in the light of the 
criminalisation of same- sex acts in TRNC and the intimate relationship 
the applicant had developed with a British citizen in the meantime.29 
On this occasion, the Court found the application inadmissible for being 
manifestly ill- founded. Almost a decade later, in 1998, the Commission 
again dealt with a SMAC in Shahram Sobhani v Sweden, where an Iranian 
gay man who applied for asylum in Sweden on grounds of his homosexu-
ality saw his claim denied.30 While his application to the Commission for 
violation of Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR was being considered, the Swedish 
government quashed the expulsion order and granted the applicant a 
permanent residence permit, thus leading the claimant to withdraw his 
application and the application to be struck out by the Commission.
These two cases set a leitmotif:  ever since, the Court has for the 
most part found applications related to SMACs inadmissible for being 
manifestly ill- founded or has struck them out. For example, F. v United 
Kingdom31 and I.I.N. v the Netherlands,32 both involving Iranian gay men, 
were found manifestly ill- founded, as well as A.N. v France, involving a 
Senegalese gay man,33 and M.B. v the Netherlands, involving a Guinean 
gay man.34 The Court has also found inadmissible the application in the 
interesting H.A. and H.A. v Norway case, involving two Iranian brothers 
with asylum claims on multiple grounds (religion and sexual orienta-
tion). In this case, sexual orientation was a perceived characteristic of 
the applicant.35 Although the Court also found the application manifestly 
ill- founded in I.K.  v Switzerland,36 based on the domestic authorities’ 
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signal a change in rhetoric: the Court acknowledged sexual orientation 
as a fundamental characteristic, talked about the need to be sensitive 
in the assessment of applicants’ credibility and asserted the inappropri-
ateness of ‘concealment reasoning’ in asylum claims (see ‘Exposing the 
skeletons in the Court’s closet’ for further discussion). At any rate, the 
outcome remained negative, which suggests there is still a long way to 
go until the Court is ready to truly protect the rights of applicants in the 
case of SMACs.
Several applications have been struck out on the basis that national 
authorities had in the meantime taken measures that addressed the 
applicant’s claim, such as suspending a return order in K.N. and Others 
v France,37 granting an asylum- based residence permit in A.S.B.  v the 
Netherlands,38 conceding a continuous residence permit for work for 
one year, with the possibility of requesting a renewal, in A.E. v Finland,39 
agreeing to re- examine the asylum claim in M.B.  v Spain,40 accepting 
a fresh asylum claim in A.T.  v Sweden,41 ordering that the claim be 
reassessed in E.S. v Spain,42 and granting a residence permit to the appli-
cant in A.R.B. v the Netherlands.43
On a few occasions, the Court has also struck out applications 
because of the applicants having lost contact with their legal representa-
tive, such as in R.A. v France,44 involving a Pakistani gay man, and D.B.N. v 
United Kingdom,45 involving the first lesbian asylum claimant to file a case 
with the Strasbourg Court. On other occasions, applications were struck 
out owing to the lack of a reply from the applicant to the observations 
submitted by the respondent State and third parties, as in M.T. v France, 
involving a gay Cameroonian man.46 In a different context, the Court has 
also struck out the application in Khudoberdi Turgunaliyevich Nurmatov 
(Ali Feruz) v Russia, which referred to an Uzbek gay man detained in 
Moscow.47 What set this case apart from all other SMAC applications 
before Strasbourg is that the applicant was a publicly known jour-
nalist, who regularly contributed to a weekly newspaper with national 
coverage  – Novaya Gazeta  – and who had dealt with a wide array of 
issues, including LGBTIQ+ rights. After several months in detention in 
Russia, the applicant was allowed to travel to Germany, where authorities 
granted him asylum. On this account, the Court struck out the Article 3 
claim as well as considering the Article 5 claim inadmissible.
The Court has only considered admissible three SMAC- related 
applications, and two of these led to a finding of no violation of an 
ECHR article. The first was the decision in M.K.N.  v Sweden, in which 
the Court finally recognised that SMACs fall within the remit of the 
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affording the benefit of the doubt to asylum claimants, it sided with the 
Swedish authorities regarding the possibility of internal relocation and 
the negative credibility assessment. The Court thus held that returning 
the claimant to Iraq did not constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. The 
second one was the infamous decision in M.E. v Sweden,49 in which the 
Court had to deal with the case of a Libyan asylum claimant in a same- 
sex relationship in Sweden, who had been required to return to Libya 
to obtain a family reunification visa. Although the applicant had been 
the target of death threats from his family for having married someone 
of the same sex, the Strasbourg Court found that the requirement that 
the claimant be ‘discreet’ about his sexuality (effectively ‘concealing’ 
it) for a period of time in Libya was not a violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
This decision was severely criticised in a powerful dissenting opinion by 
Judge Power- Forde, who stated:  ‘The majority’s conclusion in this case 
does not “fit” the current state of International and European law on this 
important question of fundamental human rights. … The reasoning is 
flawed and unconvincing.’ While this decision was being referred to the 
Court’s Grand Chamber, the Swedish Migration Board decided to grant 
the applicant a permanent residence permit because of the deterioration 
of conditions in Libya, leading the Court to strike out the case.50
The only finding of a violation of an ECHR article in a SMAC- related 
application came with O.M. v Hungary,51 in which the Strasbourg Court 
dealt with the case of an Iranian gay man who was detained for two 
months in Hungary and then granted refugee status. Here, the Court 
found that there had been a violation of Article 5 ECHR, especially in 
view of the authorities’ disregard for the particular vulnerability of 
O.M. during his detention, and awarded the claimant compensation. The 
positive decision in O.M. v Hungary had given hope of a Court more sen-
sitive towards SMACs. Nonetheless, what has followed is a long string of 
SMAC applications either being held inadmissible or struck out, with no 
single finding of violation of an ECHR right ever since, quickly dashing 
any such hopes of a more supportive Court. Furthermore, O.M. v Hungary 
did not relate to the asylum claim itself, so there is effectively no finding 
of a violation of an ECHR article in relation to a SMAC as such.
a summary assessment
Overall, the body of Strasbourg jurisprudence that has developed around 
SMACs indicates an insufficient willingness to protect these applicants 
from persecution. Even decisions significant for introducing positive 
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fall within the remit of Article 3 ECHR, reinforce the image of a Court 
unsympathetic towards SMACs. One might attribute such results to 
the fact that the asylum claims found credible by domestic authorities 
are decided positively at domestic level, and only the ones that are not 
found credible reach Strasbourg. Yet that does not justify the substan-
tive decisions across all the jurisprudence discussed above. Moreover, 
this image of an unsympathetic Court – or ‘static and unresponsive’, in 
the words of Falcetta and Johnson – becomes even more apparent when 
one contrasts this restrictive line of jurisprudence with the judgments 
the Court has produced in relation to cases involving sexual orienta-
tion and migrants’ residence issues (Falcetta & Johnson 2018, 215). All 
this reinforces the idea of a Court detached from the suffering of SMAC 
applicants, thus dehumanising them.
As Ammaturo points out, ‘If there were a genuine interest in 
defending individuals  – either citizens or non- citizens  – from human 
rights abuses, stories of structural violence or harassment would be 
enough to grant protection, without the applicants having to demon-
strate a threat of death or an extreme punishment’ (Ammaturo 2017, 
57). In none of the decisions discussed here is there any reference to 
the Yogyakarta Principles and only in one case – I.K. v Switzerland – is 
there a reference to the UNHCR’s guidelines on refugee claims based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity (UNHCR 2012). This practically 
inexistent consideration of international standard- setting documents 
in this field reinforces the lack of willingness from the Strasbourg Court 
to engage fully with the scope of rights of SMAC applicants, especially 
considering that the Court regularly refers to external sources in other 
types of claims.52 If the Court were open to genuinely considering such 
external sources, this would go some way to address the concerns raised 
by a queer intersectional perspective, by recognising and engaging with 
the variety of rights, characteristics and experiences of sexual minorities.
The increasingly frequent references by the parties and the 
Strasbourg Court to the jurisprudence of the CJEU could, in theory, 
translate into better outcomes for SMAC applicants. The CJEU has 
slowly developed a body of SMAC jurisprudence that, despite room for 
improvement, does possess many positive elements (Ferreira 2018). 
Moreover, although the relationship between the CJEU and Strasbourg 
Court has not always been clear or mutually supportive, there are 
plenty of examples of positive judicial dialogue (Rackow 2016). Yet, in 
practice, the CJEU jurisprudence has been used either to reinforce the 
argumentation in favour of a negative outcome or to dot negative argu-
mentation with some positive references to the legal protection afforded 
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to the applicants. As an example of the former, in I.K. v Switzerland the 
CJEU’s decision in X, Y and Z is only alluded to by the Swiss authorities 
to support the conclusion that the applicant’s claim was unfounded.53 As 
an example of the latter, in A.N. v France the Court acknowledged that 
the third parties intervening in the case referred to the decision in X, Y 
and Z to highlight the wrongness of the ‘discretion argument’, but the 
Court still concluded that the application was manifestly ill- founded on 
other grounds. Similarly, in M.B. v the Netherlands the Court referred to 
the CJEU decisions in X, Y and Z and A, B and C, drawing some positive 
elements from these cases for the applicant, but nevertheless again found 
the application to be manifestly ill- founded on other grounds.54 Finally, 
the initial reference to X, Y and Z in the Court’s first decision in M.E. v 
Sweden was ignored when the Court subsequently imposed an obliga-
tion on the applicant to conceal his sexuality upon return. The fact that 
the majority agreed on this point is stunning, as the CJEU’s decision in 
X, Y and Z could not have been clearer about there being no room for 
the ‘discretion argument’ in the asylum procedure. This deviation from 
a positive feature in X, Y and Z indirectly weakened the asylum system in 
Europe, by undermining the CJEU’s authority and the persuasiveness of 
its decisions. This tension may be a mere reflection of the often fraught 
relationship between the CJEU and Strasbourg (including in the field of 
asylum), and of the heavily politicised debates that affect these Courts, 
such as the debate about the EU’s accession to the ECHR (Rackow 2016). 
When the consequences include a potential danger to an applicant’s life, 
the Strasbourg Court should be able to rise to the occasion and protect 
human rights above all.
Another noticeable and disappointing feature in this body of 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is the apparent strategy of the member states 
to solve, delay or revisit the applicant’s claim for international protection 
in an obvious attempt to pre- empt negative decisions from the Court or 
simply lead the Court to strike out the application. The long list of cases 
(partially or completely) struck out on account of the respondent state’s 
decision to somehow revisit its refusal of international protection – 10 
out of the 23 analysed – is clearly suggestive of that.55 Specific examples 
can be found in A.E.  v Finland, for example:  the Finnish authorities 
avoided a substantive decision from the Court by granting to the appli-
cant a continuous residence permit for work for one year, with the possi-
bility of requesting a renewal. This not only led to the Court striking out 
the application, but crucially also overlooks the fact that the applicant’s 
life remained in limbo and the Finnish authorities might very well deny 
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the Spanish authorities decided to reopen the administrative procedure 
and re- examine the asylum claim in question while the Court was ana-
lysing the application, so the Court struck out the application. Although 
this decision is perfectly legitimate in the light of the Court’s rules and its 
jurisprudence in such circumstances, it has been lamented for missing 
the opportunity to provide greater clarity on the issues it raised (ILGA- 
Europe 2017). A third example can be seen in A.T. v Sweden, in which the 
Swedish authorities considered the expulsion order statute- barred and 
accepted a fresh asylum claim while the Court was analysing the original 
claim, which led to the Court’s decision to strike out the application. In a 
slightly different scenario, but with similar consequences, Russia escaped 
condemnation in Nurmatov (Ali Feruz) v Russia by letting the applicant 
travel to Germany, where authorities granted him asylum. While it is for-
tunate that the applicant is now in safety, it is lamentable that once again 
the Court was deprived (or deprived itself) of the possibility of analysing 
the substance of the claim. The most recent example of this strategy can 
be seen in A.R.B. v the Netherlands, in which the Netherlands granted a 
residence permit to the applicant, which led to the Court striking out 
the case.
One may believe that such a state strategy is legitimate and that 
the Court should not be criticised for simply using the ECHR rules to 
manage its workload as effectively as possible. Yet, Article 37 ECHR also 
states that the Court ‘shall continue the examination of the application if 
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto so requires’ and that it ‘may decide to restore an application to its 
list of cases if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course’. 
The strategy of these states not only affects migrants more generally but 
also seriously undermines applicants’ human rights (Dembour 2015, 
325). In the light of the vulnerable and precarious position in which 
these applicants are left by states in these circumstances, the Court 
would be not only entitled, but also required, not to strike out several of 
the applications mentioned above, for the sake of effectively protecting 
the rights of the applicants. In this process, the Court also disregards the 
particular characteristics of the applicants in these cases and likewise the 
fact that the Court’s refusal to analyse the substance of the applications 
may leave them even more vulnerable. An intersectional approach to 
these cases is thus in order.
Overall, we are faced with a disappointing body of jurisprudence 
from the Strasbourg Court, which can be criticised on a range of grounds 
and is severely lacking from a queer intersectional perspective. In the 
next section, three further key areas of criticism are analysed, which 
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will render more evident the flaws and the scope for improvement of the 
decisions in question.
Exposing the skeletons in the Court’s closet
The Strasbourg Court does not apply the Refugee Convention, so it is not 
directly concerned with ensuring the fulfilment of requirements such 
as ‘demonstrating a fear of persecution’, membership of a ‘particular 
social group’, ‘credibility’ or lack of ‘internal relocation alternative’ 
(UNHCR 2019). Instead, the Court analyses such international protec-
tion claims from the prism of the ECHR. Such analysis – as carried out in 
the Strasbourg SMAC jurisprudence so far – entails many ‘skeletons’ that 
need to be exposed.
the threshold for violation of ECHR articles
Instead of determining whether there is a ‘risk of persecution’ under the 
Refugee Convention, the Court is concerned with determining whether 
there is a risk of violation of an ECHR right upon the return of the appli-
cant to their country of origin. As mentioned above, however, in this 
context the Court is generally only concerned with possible violations 
of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and only more rarely with violations of other 
ECHR articles. To carry out this assessment, the Court often refers to the 
information submitted by the parties in relation to the situation in the 
applicant’s country of origin. The analysis of the quality of such infor-
mation will serve as a springboard for this section. The analysis will then 
move to the restrictive use of the ECHR, the high threshold adopted by 
the Court to find a violation and the way the Court has dealt with the 
notion of ‘discretion’.
To carry out their assessment of international protection claims, 
national authorities are expected to rely on precise and up- to- date 
country of origin information (COI) and information regarding coun-
tries through which the claimant may have transited. Despite the lack of 
relevant COI on sexual minorities, asylum claimants may well be victims 
of persecution warranting international protection, as the information 
gathered in relation to the country of origin, ‘first country of asylum’ and 
‘third countries’ often omits elements regarding sexual minorities. Based 
on COI, national authorities often adopt lists of ‘safe countries’, which 
are seen as countries from where one would generally not expect to see 
a ‘legitimate’ asylum claim. This has been a notion widely criticised by 
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both scholars and civil society for undermining the right to international 
protection (Costello 2016; ECRE 2016). Furthermore, the very notion of 
a ‘safe country’ is in tension with an intersectional approach to asylum 
claims, which requires an individual consideration of each claimant’s 
circumstances and is not compatible with wholesale analyses of coun-
tries of origin. The Strasbourg jurisprudence has, positively, adopted a 
highly critical view of the mechanistic way in which asylum authorities 
use the notion of ‘safe country’ (be it country of origin or third country/ 
country of passage). In Ilias and Ahmed, relating to Hungarian border 
procedures, the Court reiterated that the use of this notion needs to be 
carefully scrutinised against Article 3 ECHR.56 To this purpose, public 
authorities cannot simply rely on a list of ‘safe countries’ and expect 
asylum claimants to rebut that legal presumption of ‘safety’: it is ‘unfair 
and excessive’ for the public authorities to lay the whole burden of proof 
on asylum claimants and not carry out any work of assessment of the 
risk of violation of Article 3 ECHR in case of refoulement. The Court thus 
ascertained that ‘it is incumbent on the domestic authorities to carry out 
an assessment of that risk of their own motion when information about 
such a risk is ascertainable from a wide number of sources’ (para. 118).
On a less positive note, however, the Court does not offer the 
full power of the ECHR and its jurisprudence to asylum claimants. For 
example, in F. v United Kingdom, the Court oddly asserted that, despite 
all the evidence it had received about the treatment of gay men in Iran, 
it had not been proven that returning the applicant to Iran would entail 
treatment falling within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. The Court bla-
tantly downplayed the risk of criminal punishment for homosexual con-
duct and asserted that returning the applicant to Iran would not engage 
Article 8 ECHR, let alone constitute a violation of that norm.57 The Court 
adopted a similar approach in subsequent cases, such as M.E. v Sweden. 
This is at odds with the Strasbourg jurisprudence on ‘sodomy laws’ that 
criminalised same- sex conduct in many countries across Europe and that 
were finally held to have been a violation of human rights law since the 
1980s by the Strasbourg Court in seminal cases such as Dudgeon v UK,58 
Norris v Ireland59 and Modinos v Cyprus.60 While in these cases the mere 
existence of ‘sodomy laws’ in a member state (even if not enforced) was 
considered a violation of Article 8 ECHR, in relation to SMAC applications 
the Court does not believe Article 8 ECHR is engaged at all by ‘sodomy 
laws’ that may well be enforced. For this reason, Judge De Gaetano used 
his separate opinion in M.E. v Sweden to criticise the Court’s reliance on 
X, Y and Z and its tolerance of laws criminalising homosexual acts. More 
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of Article 14 ECHR, but the Court brushed that aside by asserting that the 
substance of the claim had already been analysed from the perspective of 
Article 3 ECHR, thus circumventing any analysis of Article 14 ECHR in 
the context of asylum. Foreign queer bodies are blatantly dehumanised, 
in a sort of legalised erasure of humanity, with the alleged blessing of 
established legal doctrinal principles.
What transpires evidently is that international protection 
claimants can only rely on a very limited scope of ECHR protection. 
While nationals of CoE member states can expect to benefit from the 
full scope of the ECHR while they remain within their jurisdiction 
(unless they are subject to extradition),61 migrants in general should 
expect a more limited scope of protection (Dembour 2015). People 
seeking asylum, in particular, should generally not expect to benefit 
from more than the protection of Articles 2 and 3 when it comes to 
analysing the risks they may face upon return to their countries of 
origin. In the words of Spijkerboer, with this sort of decision the Court 
is effectively asserting that ‘some fundamental rights are, actually, not 
fundamental because facilitating their violation by removal is not in 
violation of these rights’ (Spijkerboer 2018, 228). Although one may 
say that Strasbourg is not responsible for the state of human rights 
across the globe, this application of double standards on the basis of 
one’s citizenship status sits uneasily with the universality of human 
rights, has rightly been criticised by commentators (Jansen 2019, 
133), and affects SMACs in particularly acute ways.
Even if one limits oneself to relying on Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, it is 
striking how the Strasbourg Court applies these articles to SMACs on the 
basis of an extremely high threshold, thus overlooking the absolute nature 
of these norms. For example, in both F. v United Kingdom and I.I.N. v the 
Netherlands, the Court ignored the possibility of prosecution for consen-
sual and private homosexual relationships, the under- reporting of such 
instances, and the reported instances of criminal punishment of homo-
sexual conduct. In I.I.N. v the Netherlands, in particular, the Strasbourg 
Court considered a range of materials submitted as evidence, including a 
UNHCR position paper which stated:
In view of the multiplicity of executions and lashings, it cannot be 
excluded the victims thereof include persons being punished – on 
grounds of homosexuality – by death or lashing as provided for on 
the Iranian Criminal Code. Against this background, it cannot be 
asserted with certainty that the criminal law provisions on homo-
sexuality only have a theoretical significance.
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Yet, similarly to F. v United Kingdom, the Court found the application mani-
festly ill- founded. In both F. v United Kingdom and I.I.N. v the Netherlands, 
gay Iranian asylum claimants conformed to the Western, popular notion 
of a ‘gay man’ and described the violence they had suffered in their home 
country. This ‘hypervisible Iranian queer’ (Shakhsari 2012) is someone 
who engages to as great a degree as one can expect with the asylum 
system and addresses all the requirements one may be expected to fulfil 
in asylum claims. And yet that was not enough, as the Strasbourg Court 
overlooked their humanity and dismissed their claims, denying the risk 
of cruel or inhuman punishment upon their return to Iran.
The same approach was to be adopted in subsequent decisions. 
In M.E.  v Sweden, for example, although the applicant had been the 
target of death threats from his family for having married someone of 
the same sex in Sweden, the Court denied his application. This decision 
was widely criticised for disregarding the fact that, independently of 
whether the criminal penalties for homosexuality in Libya were enforced 
or not, ‘a hostile attitude towards anyone suspected of being homosexual 
permeated local culture’, instances of massive violence against gay men 
had been reported, and all diplomatic representations in Libya had 
been closed down (Falcetta 2015). The decision itself referred to – but 
remained uninfluenced by – official reports by international organisations 
and domestic authorities confirming violence against civilians, active 
extremist groups, continued arbitrary detention of thousands of per-
sons outside state control, and persecution of homosexuals. Again, a 
queer foreign body is the victim of a violent process of dehumanisation, 
betraying an acutely detached Court.
More recently, in A.N. v France, involving a Muslim gay Senegalese 
man, the Court determined that, although same- sex conduct is 
criminalised in Senegal, with a prison sentence of up to five years, and 
there are on average ten convictions each year on this basis, the enforce-
ment of this norm was not ‘systematic’. The Court pursued the same 
line of argumentation in M.B.  v the Netherlands, involving a gay man 
from Guinea, where  – according to the Dutch authorities’ own official 
country guidance report – ‘there are deeply rooted social, religious and 
cultural taboos with respect to homosexuality’. Despite NGO and Dutch 
authorities’ own reports indicating the opposite, the Court found that 
the Guinean criminal offence of same- sex conduct was not ‘systematic-
ally applied’. ‘Systematically’ implies that the Court intends to cover all or 
practically all instances of violation of the law, which is unreasonable: it 
effectively means that no criminal norm in any system is enforced in a sys-
tematic way, as there are always instances where criminally punishable 
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conducts are not prosecuted for the most various reasons. Furthermore, 
this line of argumentation overlooks the widespread dangerous societal, 
structural and institutional effects that the mere criminalisation of same- 
sex conduct, even when the prohibition is not actively enforced by public 
authorities, can have on the well- being and protection of sexual minor-
ities, including the facilitation of blackmail, extortion, severe discrim-
ination and other forms of serious harm (Phillips 2009; UNHCR 2012, 
para. 26).
The unreasonably high threshold of the Court in these cases is thus 
excruciatingly obvious and is in contradiction with the standards of the 
UN bodies, which have asserted that ‘inconsistencies and ambiguities’ in 
particular cases ‘are not of a nature as to undermine the reality of the 
feared risks’62 and that the fact that domestic authorities ‘are not actively 
persecuting homosexuals does not rule out that such prosecution can 
occur’.63 Moreover, such a high threshold is also arguably in contradiction 
with the Court’s own jurisprudence, to the extent that, in these cases, the 
Court should be considering whether there is a ‘real risk’ of even a single 
violation of Articles 2 or 3 ECHR, rather than whether there is a ‘system-
atic application’ of norms that violate ECHR rights. Crucially, this juris-
prudence ignores the need to adopt an intersectional approach to SMACs 
and neglects how SMAC applicants’ particular range of characteristics 
and specific socio- economic context may affect potential violations of 
Articles 2 and 3.
The Court’s focus on the way such criminal offences are enforced 
can, furthermore, be denounced as hypocritical:  while in relation to 
( heterosexual) women asylum claimants the Court is only concerned 
with whether there are laws in place to protect women from ill- treatment 
irrespective of whether those norms are applied in practice (Peroni 
2018, 353), when it comes to SMACs the Court does the opposite and is 
only concerned with signs of lack of enforcement of laws criminalising 
same- sex conduct irrespective of whether or not those laws still cause 
harm even when not enforced. What is clear, then, is that the Court is 
not concerned with any actual harm the applicants may risk suffering 
but rather with finding more or less formulaic methods of denying the 
applications. Crucially, there is a growing movement to consider the 
criminalisation of same- sex conduct between consenting adults to 
be a violation of Article 3 ECHR in itself, owing to the degrading and 
dehumanising nature of these criminal offences (Danisi 2015, 298– 300; 
Johnson & Falcetta 2018).
The Strasbourg jurisprudence on SMACs has also touched on the 
idea that applicants may be returned to their countries of origin and be 
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‘discreet’ about their sexuality (effectively concealing it), so as to avoid 
any harm coming their way. In M.K.N. v Sweden, the Strasbourg Court 
had already hinted at sympathising with this argument when it denied 
the applicant’s claim, perhaps influenced by the Swedish government’s 
argument that, as the claimant intended to go on living with his wife, 
there was no risk of him demonstrating his sexual orientation upon his 
return  – and thus he would remain ‘discreet’. Although such a ‘discre-
tion’ or ‘concealment’ argument or requirement was widely used across 
Europe for many years, in 2013 the CJEU condemned this idea beyond 
doubt in X, Y and Z. Yet, somewhat anachronistically, the Strasbourg 
Court’s decision in M.E.  v Sweden retained the ‘discretion require-
ment’ as appropriate, even if for a relatively short period of time, and 
thus found no violation of Article 3 ECHR under these circumstances. 
Although the Swedish authorities subsequently granted the applicant a 
permanent residence permit, the harm had been done:  the Court had 
offered legitimacy to the ‘discretion requirement’ at a time when most 
European domestic jurisdictions had abandoned it, and this was rightly 
criticised by commentators (Fraser 2014; Steendam 2014). In the light 
of the eradication of the ‘discretion requirement’ in most of its forms 
from most of the European domestic jurisdictions, one could legitimately 
expect a different position from the Strasbourg Court in subsequent, 
similar cases. That is what happened in I.K. v Switzerland, in which the 
Court acknowledged that there was no room for discretion in relation to 
such a fundamental aspect of one’s identity and conscience. And yet the 
outcome was negative for the applicant. The Court again neglects SMAC 
applicants’ individual composite of characteristics and how it may expose 
them to violence and persecution. Ultimately, this makes one wonder 
when rhetoric will translate into genuine queer rights vindication.
Rules of evidence and assessment of credibility
SMACs are notoriously difficult to prove in any jurisdiction (Jansen & 
Spijkerboer 2011). As with any other asylum claim, the success of SMACs 
is fundamentally dependent on the evidentiary standards adopted and 
the credibility assessment carried out by the decision- maker. As many 
scholars have already pointed out, a ‘culture of disbelief’ pervades some 
domestic asylum authorities, such as the Home Office in the UK (Millbank 
2009; Souter 2011). Even more worryingly, the Strasbourg Court adopts 
a dangerously hands- off approach to the scrutiny of the credibility 
assessment carried out by domestic authorities, leaving applicants at 
the mercy of often hostile domestic authorities. Although the Court is 
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admittedly constrained by its own statute and procedural rules, such as 
admissibility criteria (Article 35 ECHR) and striking- out rules (Article 37 
ECHR), there is scope to scrutinise more thoroughly member states’ rules 
of evidence and assessment of credibility.
The Strasbourg jurisprudence’s leitmotif in this field is deference 
towards domestic authorities, something recognised by the Court’s 
judges themselves and justified on the basis of the Court’s subsidiary role 
and limited tools (Ravarani 2017, 3– 4). This deference is blatant in the 
decisions subscribing to negative credibility assessments. Clear examples 
can be found in relation to the UK and French domestic authorities. 
In F.  v United Kingdom, the domestic authorities questioned F.’s cred-
ibility in relation to the length of time he spent in prison and his nation-
ality. They also queried why he had not claimed asylum in Turkey. On 
appeal, the UK authorities reiterated the assessment of lack of credibility. 
The Court also chose to accept the assessment of lack of credibility of 
the domestic authorities, thus siding with the ‘culture of disbelief’ of the 
UK asylum authorities. In A.N. v France, the Court also subscribed to the 
French authorities’ assessment of the facts, thus accepting the ‘verdict’ 
of lack of credibility. Although the Court acknowledged the difficulty of 
proving SMACs owing to the personal nature of the matters at hand, it 
sided with the French government to reiterate the insufficiency of the evi-
dence submitted by the applicant. Deference – and detachment – once 
again prevailed.
Further examples of such deference to the negative assessments of 
credibility carried out by domestic authorities can be found in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, such as M.E. v Sweden, M.B. v Spain, E.S. v Spain and I.K. v 
Switzerland. Even when the Court rhetorically highlights that the cred-
ibility assessment has to be carried out in an individual and delicate 
manner, as it asserted in I.K. v Switzerland, deference prevails and the 
domestic authority’s negative credibility assessment stands. A  particu-
larly crass example of such excessive deference can be seen in M.B.  v 
the Netherlands, in which the Court deferred to the Dutch authorities’ 
assessment of the applicant’s credibility, even though the Dutch author-
ities expected that the applicant would be able to state the number of 
people involved in a mob attack against him and the number of police 
officers who arrived afterwards. It is submitted that it would have 
been ‘incredible’ if the applicant had been able to point out the exact 
number of such attackers and police officers, as it is highly unlikely that 
an individual would be able to count the number of people beating up 
or detaining them. Moreover, the Court shows no sign of reflecting on 
the possible influence of individual mental health and trauma, or local 
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cultural or social factors, on the accounts of applicants that may appear 
incredible to European decision- makers, although such impact has been 
analysed and evidenced at length (Bögner, Herlihy & Brewin 2007). On 
the contrary, the Court is too easily convinced by the domestic author-
ities’ preoccupation with apparent inconsistencies or oddities.64
The principle of the benefit of the doubt – a principle whose import-
ance in asylum adjudication is highlighted in the UNHCR guidance 
(UNHCR 2019) – is ultimately ignored by both domestic authorities and 
the Strasbourg Court, thus unlawfully depriving SMAC applicants of a key 
legal tool. A striking example can be seen in M.K.N. v Sweden, in which, 
despite all the evidence submitted by the applicant, the Swedish Migration 
Board claimed that M.K.N.’s account was not credible. The Migration Court 
reiterated this assessment of lack of credibility owing to the late disclosure 
of his sexuality (see the subsection ‘Intersecting characteristics and socio-
cultural factors’, below). Before the Strasbourg Court, M.K.N. claimed to 
have provided a reasonable explanation for the late disclosure and asked 
to be given the benefit of the doubt. The Strasbourg Court confirmed 
the importance of affording the benefit of the doubt to asylum claimants 
but also agreed with the Swedish authorities regarding the possibility of 
internal relocation and the credibility assessment, in particular in relation 
to the claimant’s homosexual relationship. In the end, the Court refused 
to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt, thus again deferring to the 
credibility assessment of the domestic authorities. The same approach by 
the Court can be seen in the first decision in M.E. v Sweden.
The Court thus seems willing to accept member states’ choices 
as to which aspects of asylum claimants’ testimonies matter, and how 
they should matter, without offering domestic authorities any critical 
comments, positive guidance or admonition for the clearly inadequate 
application of rules on evidence and findings on credibility. Both member 
states and the Strasbourg Court are accomplices in this violence caused 
to foreign queer bodies in search of international protection. It is thus apt 
to ask: Who’s afraid of the benefit of the doubt?
intersecting characteristics and sociocultural factors
Besides analysing the risk of violation of an ECHR article upon return 
(see ‘The threshold for violation of ECHR articles’), and the overall cred-
ibility of the applicant (‘Rules of evidence and assessment of credibility’), 
the Court is often called upon to consider a range of other legal and social 
aspects relevant to asylum claims that are intertwined with a range of 
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with these other aspects (including in the light of COI, discussed in ‘The 
threshold for violation of ECHR articles’) has an impact on how the Court 
analyses both the risk of violation of an ECHR article upon return and 
the credibility of the applicant. It is thus crucial to consider those as well 
and to bring to fruition an intersectional approach to the Court’s SMAC 
jurisprudence.
One such aspect is the ‘internal relocation alternative’, i.e., an indi-
vidual seeking asylum being able to return to their country of origin and 
relocate within it to escape the risk of persecution. In the light of how 
widespread discrimination and violence against sexual minorities can be 
in the countries of origin of most SMAC applicants, ‘internal relocation’ is 
rarely available to them (UNHCR 2012, paras 51– 6). In M.K.N. v Sweden, 
the Strasbourg Court uncritically endorsed the Swedish authorities’ 
assertion that the Christian religious beliefs of the Iraqi claimant – who 
had had a homosexual relationship in Iraq and had been discovered  – 
would allow him to relocate to the Kurdistan region. Similarly, in A.N. v 
France, the applicant – a Muslim man who had been the victim of black-
mail, physically assaulted by rioters and held captive and violently 
assaulted by relatives  – submitted evidence that sexual minorities had 
to move residence regularly in Senegal to avoid being found out, but 
the French government insisted that internal relocation was realistic 
and the Court simply referred back to the domestic assessment of the 
facts, without showing any interest in questioning the reasonableness of 
internal relocation in Senegal.
Another aspect of SMAC applicants’ experiences that can have a 
negative impact on the success of their claims is the ‘late disclosure’ of 
one’s sexuality. The reality is that SMAC applicants often do not know 
that their sexual orientation can be of relevance for the purposes of 
obtaining international protection and, even if they do, many do not 
know how to structure their narratives or that they should include all the 
elements that may possess relevance to a European decision- maker. Most 
importantly, many SMAC applicants will not feel comfortable – or may 
even feel utterly mortified for religious, cultural or personal reasons  – 
at the thought of discussing their sexual orientation with a complete 
stranger, in what is often a hostile environment. The Strasbourg Court’s 
decision in M.K.N.  v Sweden is a good example of how asylum author-
ities fail to grasp the difficulties a sexual minority asylum claimant may 
have in disclosing their past experiences. In this case, the claimant’s 
account of his past homosexual relationship was denied credibility for 
having been reported late, although the late disclosure could be justified 
by the fact that the claimant had an opposite- sex spouse, had children 
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and had lived in a strongly conservative and unstable country affected 
by religious conflicts. M.K.N. himself attributed the late disclosure of this 
element of his account to not knowing that homosexuality was (socially 
and legally) accepted in Sweden. The Court, however, chose to disregard 
the difficulties involved in disclosing to authorities one’s past homo-
sexual relationships, even in such complex and adverse circumstances. 
Similarly, in M.E.  v Sweden, the Court chose to side with the Swedish 
authorities in their assessment of lack of credibility on account of the late 
disclosure of M.E.’s sexuality. More recently, however, the CJEU asserted 
in A, B and C that delays in disclosing one’s sexuality should not automat-
ically be held against asylum claimants to harm their credibility. One can 
only hope that this will prove valuable in guiding domestic authorities 
towards not placing excessive importance on late disclosures.65
More generally, the Court fails to grasp the complexity of applicants’ 
lives and sociocultural backgrounds and reduces them to ‘siloed’ identities 
that can fit neatly into domestic asylum systems and the ECHR system as 
envisaged by European mindsets. In I.I.N. v the Netherlands, for example, 
the gay Iranian asylum claimant had come into contact with the Iranian 
authorities not only because of his homosexuality but also because of 
his participation in protests. Yet his political activism only merits a brief 
mention amongst the facts reported and is ignored in the Court’s analysis. 
Similarly, in M.K.N. v Sweden, although the applicant had an opposite- sex 
spouse, had children and risked persecution on grounds of his sexuality, 
religious beliefs and (relatively good) economic condition, the Court paid 
no heed to the ‘messiness’ of the applicant’s account and simply relied 
on the Swedish authorities’ negative credibility assessment, focusing on 
only one of the applicant’s characteristics – his sexuality. Generally, one 
can find passing references to some of the applicants’ characteristics or 
circumstances:  the applicant in M.E.  v Sweden fearing that the Libyan 
diaspora in Sweden would pass the news about his same- sex marriage 
to Libya; the applicant in A.N. v France being gay, Muslim and afraid of 
discrimination from his diaspora community; or the gay male applicant 
in M.B.  v the Netherlands not knowing many details about his partner, 
perhaps owing to the clandestine nature of their relationship in a society 
oppressive towards sexual minorities.
Yet, disappointingly, the Court only mentions these aspects but 
never addresses or analyses them to any extent as the significant socio- 
cultural dynamics and identifiers that they are or allows them to have 
any positive bearing on the outcome of the case. It would have been 
particularly interesting in M.B. v Spain – involving a lesbian woman of 
a particular ethnicity that was at the origin of her exposure to human 
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rights violations – to see how the Court would deal with issues of crim-
inalisation and credibility in a context where ethnicity, gender and sexu-
ality intersect. Similarly, the decision in H.A.  and H.A.  – where one of 
the brothers feared persecution on the basis of both religion and sexual 
orientation – would have been an excellent opportunity to engage with 
the way in which religion and sexuality may potentiate persecution and 
human rights violations, but the Court – worryingly – opted to dismiss 
that matter with a very terse analysis of the applicant’s concerns, despite 
the widely known severe treatment of gay (or just perceived as gay) men 
in Iran (Mendos 2019).
Strasbourg’s overall lacklustre approach to SMACs and the 
richness of these applicants’ lives can ultimately dissuade applicants 
from pursuing their claims, with potentially terrible effects on their 
lives, aggravated in cases where specific combinations of characteristics 
render claimants particularly vulnerable to gender and sexual 
oppression. Consciously pursuing a queer intersectional approach to 
these cases can support better decision- making in Strasbourg, and we 
can legitimately expect more from the Court in terms of how it handles 
such complex lives and applications.
Which way forward for the European sexual minority 
asylum framework?
The CoE, and in particular the Strasbourg Court, have undoubtedly 
contributed to many positive developments for sexual minorities across 
Europe. Yet, in relation to SMACs, the current inadequacies are con-
spicuous. Although many of these inadequacies may seem necessary by- 
products of the structure and functioning rules of the CoE and the Court, 
it is realistic to expect a fairer treatment of SMACs. Both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses of the Strasbourg jurisprudence on SMACs clearly 
reveal the unwillingness of the Court to genuinely and respectfully 
engage with these applicants’ accounts and rights. Sporadic references 
to more positive CJEU decisions in this field have so far not led to any 
progress in Strasbourg. Worse, member states have been successful in 
strategically prompting the Court to strike out applications by solving, 
delaying or revisiting applicants’ claims. This leaves applicants in pre-
carious situations and circumvents jurisprudential developments in this 
field. Whether the Court adopts this approach to avoid antagonising 
member states, to respect their margin of appreciation, to manage its 
workload, to avoid opening the ‘floodgates’ to this type of claim, or for 
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any other reason, it needs to change its course to honour its mission and 
preserve the humanity of these claimants, even if that may well mean 
‘exporting’ the Convention’s values and applying them to seven billion 
people (Ravarani 2017, 4). Foreign queer bodies have human rights 
as well.
To vindicate the rights of SMAC applicants and foster judgments 
better informed by a queer intersectional perspective, the Strasbourg 
Court needs to improve its jurisprudence on several levels. First, the 
Court needs to apply the full range of ECHR articles (in particular Articles 
8 and 14)  to these claims when analysing the risks the applicants will 
encounter if they are returned to their country of origin. The Court also 
needs to lower the current threshold at which a risk becomes so severe as 
to be incompatible with the ECHR. States would still retain considerable 
agency to deport individuals with no human rights claims under a newly 
reduced threshold for deeming a risk ‘severe enough’ to be incompatible 
with the ECHR. In short, this would not mean ‘opening the floodgates’ 
to any challenge to deportation orders, because some leeway to deport 
individuals would remain.
Second, the Court needs to stop deferring to the ‘culture of disbe-
lief’ engrained in many domestic authorities and start taking the prin-
ciple of the benefit of the doubt seriously and hold domestic authorities 
against an appropriate standard of proof in these cases. If this means – as 
some may argue – that a small number of ‘fake claims’ succeed, then this 
is a reasonable price to pay for robust and fair international protection 
and human rights systems. Third, the Court needs to immerse itself in 
the applicants’ whole stories and consider seriously all the individual 
characteristics, identifiers and sociocultural factors involved in each 
case. This means adopting an intersectional approach to deal in a more 
culturally and socially appropriate way with issues such as assessing 
whether there is any ‘internal relocation alternative’ and whether the ‘late 
 disclosure’ of one’s sexuality should have any bearing on an applicant’s 
claim. Although this may at first seem to require further resources, it can 
in effect be pursued by making use of quality training materials and COI 
already in existence.
Essentially, it is submitted that the Court has so far failed to do 
justice to SMAC applicants by detaching itself from the violence to 
which they are submitted in their countries of origin and in Europe. The 
Court has repeatedly ignored the complexity and richness of applicants’ 
accounts and tended to operate within the limited parameters of narrow 
legal readings of the ECHR and the Court’s relationships with the member 
states. This does a disservice to the applicants’ claims and leads to unfair 
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outcomes. If the Strasbourg Court were to become more sensitive to a 
queer intersectional approach to SMAC applications, better justice would 
be done.
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 1. Despite their different legal and technical meanings, the expressions ‘asylum’, ‘refuge’ and 
‘international protection’ will be used somewhat interchangeably throughout this text for 
convenience.
 2. The expression ‘sexual minorities’ will be used in this chapter to refer to non- heterosexual 
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and in other languages, so they will be used here without any negative connotation. Much 
of the discussion in this chapter also relates to or affects gender identity asylum claims, but 
because the Strasbourg Court has so far only dealt with one application related to gender 
identity asylum, such applications will fall outside the scope of this contribution. The appli-
cation in question related to a transsexual Iranian refugee in Hungary, already granted inter-
national protection who claimed a violation of Article 8 ECHR for having been denied a change 
of legal status of name and gender. The Court found in favour of the applicant and awarded 
non-pecuniary damages: Jafarizad Barenji Rana v Hungary, Application no. 40888/17, 16 July 
2020.
 3. UN General Assembly, ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’, 28 July 1951, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
 4. UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267.
 5. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Accelerated asylum procedures in Council of 
Europe member states, text adopted by the Assembly on 7 October 2005 (32nd Sitting).
 6. The European Commission of Human Rights was a body of the Council of Europe that assisted 
the Strasbourg Court until 1998 in determining whether applications were admissible, 
reaching friendly settlements and producing statements of facts and opinions on whether a 
violation had occurred. This Commission ceased to exist with the coming into force of Protocol 
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 8. Bahaddar v the Netherlands, Application no. 25894/ 94, 19 February 1998.
 9. F. v United Kingdom, Application no. 17341/ 03, 22 June 2004 (further discussed in section 
‘A bird’s-eye view’).
 10. H.I. v Switzerland, Application no. 69720/ 16, 14 December 2017.
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(Judgment of the Grand Chamber); O.M. v Hungary, Application no. 9912/ 15, 5 July 2016 
(discussed in section ‘A bird’s-eye view’).
 12. B.A.C. v Greece, Application no. 11981/ 15, 13 October 2016.
 13. G.R. v the Netherlands, Application no. 22251/ 07, 10 January 2012.
 14. An updated version, ‘The Yogyakarta Principles plus 10 (YP+10)’ (2017) is available 
at: http:// www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/ (accessed 22 August 2020).
 15. Article 14 ECHR refers exclusively to discrimination in relation to one of the rights in the 
ECHR. The 2000 Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR (ETS No. 177), which came into force in 2005, 
does contain a self- standing non- discrimination provision but has so far only been ratified by 
20 out of the 47 CoE member states.
 16. Dudgeon v UK, Application no.  7525/ 76, 22 October 1981; Norris v Ireland, Application 
no. 10581/ 83, 26 October 1988; Modinos v Cyprus, Application no. 15070/ 89, 22 April 1993.
 17. Smith and Grady v UK, Applications nos 33985/ 96 and 33986/ 96, 27 September 1999.
 18. L. and V. v Austria, Applications nos 39392/ 98 and 39829/ 98, 9 January 2003.
 19. Karner v Austria, Application no. 40016/ 98, 24 July 2003.
 20. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, Application no. 33290/ 96, 21 December 1999.
 21. Schalk and Kopf v Austria, Application no. 30141/ 04, 24 June 2010.
 22. Pajić v Croatia, Application no.  68453/ 13, 23 February 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, 
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 24. ‘Recommendation CM/ Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity’, 
adopted on 31 March 2010 at the 1081st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
 25. For a more extensive chronological narrative of this jurisprudence, see Ferreira 2019. For a 
quick overview, including information regarding the applicants, main legal bases and key 
outcomes, see the tables of European jurisprudence at Ferreira 2020.
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applications lodged but not yet decided have not been included. M.E.  v Sweden has been 
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 40. M.B. v Spain, Application no. 15109/ 15, 13 December 2016.
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criminalisation of same- sex conduct does not in itself constitute an act of persecution. This 
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 60. Modinos v Cyprus, Application no. 15070/ 89, 22 April 1993.
 61. See, for example, Soering v the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/ 88, 7 July 1989.
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